Directorate of Intelligence Approved For Release 2005/08/24** CIA-RDP80B01495R000Z00180046-9

1 April 1975

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| MEMORANDUM |
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| SUBJECT: Executive Council Meeting on 14 March 1975 |
| Mr. Proctor chaired. Substituting was |
| 1. Mr. Proctor said he sees several problems relating to the analytical "team" concept: |
| He thinks permanent combinations of individuals might not be well suited to handle changing intelligence problems; |
| He is reluctant to create additional bureaucratic structures, a reluctance shared by the drafters of the team proposal; and, |
| He does not want such teams to be tied to the NIO mechanism or to become a "shadow-NIO" system. |
| He said he likes the distinction made in the proposal between "coordinated" and "integrated" reports. He noted also that in some instances, an interdisciplinary approach detracts from the purpose and thrust of a paper, and is therefore counterproductive. |
| 2. Mr. Ernst said he shared the reluctance to multiply formal organizations, but that some structure is needed in order to foster better interdisciplinary exchanges on a continuing basis. Mr. Eisenbeiss shared the view |

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dictional boundaries.

4. Mr. Walsh said he agreed, on balance, that there was a need for some act that would give visibility to a new way of doing business.

among analysts of a new "culture" in which the territorial preserves of the past are subordinated to mutual involvement in problems that overlap juris-

that someone had to take the initiative to organize meaningful exchanges.

argued that what was needed was broad acceptance

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| STAT | 5 cautioned against limiting such exchanges to the principal production offices. In the ensuing discussion there was some concern that the teams might become too large and unwieldy, thus detracting from their specific role as organizers of production. The final consensus, however, favored terms that draw broadly on the full range of the Directorate's expertise. |
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| | 6. Mr. Proctor asked whether chairmanship of the teams should rest with OCI, as the only office organized entirely on geographic lines. Several members argued that this might cause the kind of rigidity the team concept hopes to avoid. |
| | 7. It was decided that: |
| | Mr. Proctor would issue a memorandum outlining in general terms his interest in the development of an informal, team ap- proach to closer interoffice cooperation. |
| | Office Directors would decide among themselves the nature and composition of specific teams. |

8. Mr. Proctor asked Mr. Eisenbeiss to look into whether the memorandum numbering system, which now features a separate series for each office, can be converted to a single series for the Directorate as a whole.

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| | Chief // | |
| | DDI Executive Staff | |

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25 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence Director of Economic Research

Director, Geographic and Cartographic Research

Director of Political Research Director of Strategic Research

Director, Central Reference Service

Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Director, Imagery Analysis Service

SUBJECT

Improved Integration in Production

of Finished Intelligence

- 1. I would like the addressees to develop an informal approach which will encourage greater inter-office teamwork in the production of intelligence. Teams should be formed which consist of senior analysts who share in common a responsibility and expertise in a particular geographic area or substantive problem.
- 2. The informal inter-office groups that result might initially serve as focal points for such things as:
 - --discussing production needs and plans for a particular area or problem;
 - --organizing and integrating Directorate responses to ad hoc requests;
 - --exchanging views on subjects of mutual interest;
 - --organizing country seminars.
- 3. In the process of preparing interdisciplinary intelligence, these teams must go beyond mere coordination. The teams must encourage and elicit ideas and substantive input from all members on all phases of the development of an article or research study on a major problem area--sizing the problem, formulation of the outline, analysis and writing of the report. I recognize that the degree of involvement will vary by project and subject; nevertheless, the objective must be to bring the full-range of our analytical talents to bear on intelligence problems.

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- 4. Teams should meet as often as required to bring about the desired communication among analysts working on the same areas and integration of product. Each team should consist of a substantively qualified representative from each of the five primary production offices—plus representation from CRS, FBIS, and IAS. Representatives from OSI and OWI may also be invited to participate as appropriate to the area and problem.
- 5. I would like to review our experience with the teams in a Friday Executive Council in October of this year.

| Deputy | EDWARD W. PROCTOR / Director for Intelligence |
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cc: DDS&T D/OSI D/OWI STAT

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4 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT

Proposed Guidance and Procedures for a "team" approach to Political-Military-Economic Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence

1. This memorandum is in three parts. Part I discusses the philosophy on which the proposals for new mechanisms in Part II rest. —Part III identifies the most likely team leaders for the initial "break-in" period.

Part I

2. The DCI has made clear his desire that there be more "integrated" reporting on major problems and major problem areas. He has emphasized the need, as he perceives it, to bring economic, political, and military analysis into a relationship that will result in a finished intelligence product that is more meaningful and fully useful to our customers. At the moment, many customers are acutely conscious of the interrelationship between political and economic problems. Some are beginning to call for a finished product that also integrates

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Approved For Release 2005/08/24: CIA-RDP80B01495R000700180046-9 military analysis closely. It was, for example, partly in response to such pressures that the Strategic Evaluation Center was established. Our customers are not served as well as they should be if they are offered a diet made up predominantly of discrete economic, military and political analysis, each item of which deals with only one aspect of a larger and more complex whole.

- 3. In some areas, we in the DDI have long been producing a substantial volume of integrated political/ economic/military reporting -- e.g., on the USSR and China. In other areas, while we have developed close relations and good communication among analysts, the need for an integrated product has not been as obvious as it has now become, and we as managers have done less than we could. Such areas include Western Europe and the Middle East. In these areas, we would appear to have been better at coordinating than integrating.
- 4. The difference between coordinating and integrating is basically one of approach and attitude. In our coordination process, the spirit tends to emphasize the special expertise that is presumed to attach a particular office -- a kind of "territorial imperative" colors the relationships

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Special expertise is essential, but is not all that analysts can offer each other; each surely has perceptions and ideas about the problem as a whole that deserve surfacing. In an integrative process, the analytical problem is attacked by a team, whose members emphasize making whatever contribution they can rather than defending their analytical turf.

- 5. The object of the modest, informal mechanisms that are outlined below is to encourage the further development of the spirit that produces integrated finished intelligence in the Directorate. These steps are not all that could or can be done; effective openings for integrated production will be found by analysts and managers drawing on their own experience and building on relationships and procedures they have already developed.
- 6. In addition, it is hoped that encouragement given to an integrated finished product within the DDI will be of direct benefit to the NIO, in some measure assuring that officer that the DDI analysts are regularly and continuously probing each other's minds for new ideas and thereby making easier and more fruitful the task of producing papers on a community-wide basis when these are called for.

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- 7. It should be made clear at the outset that we do not propose to make any formal organizational and procedural changes in the DDI; rather, we propose that informal, inter-office area teams be formed to facilitate production of integrated intelligence by acting as focal points for:
 - --discussing weekly production plans,
 - --organizing and integrating DDI responses
 to ad hoc NIO requests and interagency
 studies, and
 - --exchanging views on subjects of mutual interest with all DDI collection, support, and production elements as well as with components in other directorates.
- 8. Initially, we recommend that area teams be formed for:

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- --Middle East
- --USSR
- --South Asia

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OCI, OSR, and OER each would designate a principal at

the branch chief level for each of the teams. Representatives from other DDI components would be invited to

participate in the activities of the area teams as

appropriate. One principal on each team would be selected

to act as chairman. Formal minutes of meetings and similar

bureaucratic paraphernalia would be forbidden; office representatives would be responsible for keeping their supervisors informed.

9. The activities of the area teams would be as follows:

--Weekly production meetings would bring OCI, OSR, and OER branch chiefs and senior analysts for a given area together to discuss informally production plans and ideas. The objective would be to ensure that there is a full exchange of substantive views, without regard to functional responsibilities, and that suggestions for contributions are discussed well in advance of production deadlines. As a general rule, offices would limit their representation to two or three people.

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-- Area teams would provide a mechanism to assist in organizing and integrating responses to ad hoc NIO requests and interagency studies involving more than one DDI component. office that has the primary responsibility for preparing a response would involve the area team from the early stages of planning the work through the drafting and coordination process. The team would vary according to the nature of the request and would involve members of offices other than OCI, OER and OSR as appropriate. -- In addition to dealing with specific substantial issues, area teams would from time to time organize DDI-wide meetings to exchange views on subjects of mutual interest such as basic information and analytic needs. These meetings would bring together all DDI collection, substantive support, and production elements. Representatives from other directorates would be invited to participate as appropriate.

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